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Justice Stevens and the Seattle
Schools Case: A Case Study on the
Role of Righteous Anger in
Constitutional Discourse
Andrew Siegel*
As Professor Reynoso mentioned, three years ago I published a piece
with a very long title in the Fordham Law Review giving an overarching
view of Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence.' Today I want
to do three things. I want to briefly summarize what I said in the
Fordham piece in order to lay a foundation for this panel. Then I want
to talk about and apply my writings to the biggest equal protection
case to come down in the intervening three years, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I ("PICS"), a case that
challenged race-conscious student assignment plans in Seattle and
Louisville, Kentucky.2 And then finally, I want to discuss the role of
"righteous anger" in constitutional discourse, and in particular in the
writings of Supreme Court Justices.
Righteous anger may sound like an odd subject for this Symposium
but I think it is an appropriate topic for several reasons. First, I think
it helps us focus on what is most notable about the PICS case - the
case involving the schools in Seattle - which is the passion of the
dissents. Second, I think it is appropriate to our location. We're here
in King Hall, part of the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the
naming of the building after Martin Luther King, Jr., who is often cited
. Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, B.A., Yale

Univeristy; M.A., History, Princeton University; J.D., New York University. This Essay
is a revised version of remarks delivered at the UC Davis Law Review Symposium on
March 6, 2009, commemorating the career of Justice John Paul Stevens.
See generally Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul
Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2390 (2006) (providing summary of Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence).
2 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (decided together with Meredith v. Jefferson City Bd. of
Educ., 551 U.S. 701 (2007)).
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as the prime example of the power of righteous anger. We're here the
day after the powerful oral arguments in the California Supreme Court
in the California Marriage Cases, another area where righteous anger
comes to the forefront.3 Most importantly for our subject, I think
focusing in on this helps us round out the portrait of Justice Stevens
collectively painted by the articles and tributes in this Symposium and
others like it. These symposia tend to focus on the calmness, the
dispassion, the judgment of Justice Stevens, all of which are crucial
aspects of his character. 4 But sometimes they focus there at the
expense of what I would call his steel, his power, his conviction.
Anyone who has been a law clerk to Justice Stevens appreciates the
fact that one of his defining characteristics is that all the deliberation
and care he takes do not stand in the way of action. He'll sit. He'll
listen to rational argument. He wants to hear what you have to say
about cases. He'll talk to you. But then you'll reach a point where his
countenance changes ever so slightly. His eyes set. If you don't get the
hint, he'll start patting his arm. He's made up his mind; he's heard
what he needs to hear, and he's decided what he wants to decide.
The power of that conviction comes through in his writings. My
term -

and I assume this is true in most terms -

there were a

handful of incidents where, against the advice of everyone else or
without asking for the advice of everyone else, he repaired to his office
and typed out a one-page memo, or a one-page concurrence, or a onepage dissent. Sometimes he circulated these writings, other times not.
Even when he circulated them, he mostly did so without the
immediate goal of persuading the Court. Whether he elicited any
reaction from the Court -

and sometimes he did -

there was just

something he had to say, some conviction he had to express. I think
that focusing on that character trait and putting it into the literature
about Justice Stevens helps nicely to balance the picture.
My Fordham piece posits a theory of Justice Stevens's equal
protection jurisprudence that's focused on the fact that he both rejects
the standard three-tiered equal protection framework, and then,
unlike other people who reject that jurisprudence, he doesn't try to
replace the framework with some equally or more complicated set of
3 See generally Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding against
state constitutional challenge state referendum forbidding same-sex marriage, but
determining that same-sex marriages performed before effective date of referendum
remain valid).
I See generally Symposium: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1557 (2006), and the other works in this symposium. Cf. Ward Farnsworth,
Realism, Pragmatism, and Justice John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
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mediating doctrines. Instead of developing a balancing test or
presumptions or multifactor lists, he practices or tries to practice
something approaching what I call "unmediated constitutional
interpretation."5 He attempts as best as possible, in every case, to apply
unmediated judicial judgment to the constitutional text and the
constitutional values.
A little more concretely, what do I mean by that? Well, first of all,
he spends a lot of time focusing on developing and articulating a
normative vision of the Equal Protection Clause and puts his
normative formulations at the heart of his opinions, often at the very
front of those opinions. He does it slightly differently in every case,
but I think that the formulation that is most prominent is his belief
that ultimately the Equal Protection Clause is a test of whether a
particular law is the kind of law that an impartial sovereign would
adopt. He treats that question as the polar star in his interpretation
and his analysis; he never really deviates very far from it.
In answering that question, he gives us detailed and case specific
inquiry into whether that standard is met. In every significant equal
protection case, he provides a comprehensive, lawyerly examination of
the plausible rationales for the statute, probing to determine whether
an impartial legislature would have adopted such a policy. His analysis
goes beyond the statute's text; he uses real evidentiary eclecticism.
Depending on the case, he might look at the drafting history, the
history of regulations of this type, the social history of the burdened
group, the consequences of the law, or any combination of those
things. He's got a commitment to resolve each case based on a holistic
assessment of whether the government has acted as would an
impartial sovereign.
Part of his theory, or part of his method, leads him to express
explicit frustration with the rigidity of his colleagues' equal protection
methodology. He gets genuinely upset that the tiered method of
inquiry precludes his colleagues from taking into account salient
pockets of evidence, and he often derides the majority's approach,
even sometimes when he agrees with their conclusion, using words
like "wooden," "sterile," and "misleading."6 He thinks that the formal
inquiry at the heart of modern equal protection jurisprudence focuses
our energy on the wrong questions.
That's a short and dirty summary of the article with the long title.
In the Seattle and Louisville schools case, my thesis is that Justice
Stevens's methodology allows him to see something that was obscured
Siegel, supra note 1, at 2339.
6 See Siegel, supra note 1, at 2349 & nn.49-51.
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to a lot of people: it allows him to see that this was an easy case.7 Why
do I say this is an easy case? That is obviously a controversial
statement. After all, lots of people way more accomplished than me
who ultimately agree with me that the decision was wrong have
written sophisticated works talking about how hard this case was.8
To explain why I think this was an easy case, we need to follow
Justice Stevens's lead, step back from the doctrinal categories, and
simply ask, "What happened in Seattle?" 9 A lot of the relevant history
is in Justice Breyer's tour-de-force dissent." In Seattle, African
Americans have historically lived primarily in the central part of the
city." Even there, they lived in a patchwork of white and black microneighborhoods. The residential segregation in Seattle, historically, is a
result of the same combination of public and private actions and
public and private factors that created residential segregation in most
major northern cities. Back in the middle of the twentieth century and
before, the Seattle School District took any number of actions to
ensure minimal integration of their schools. Their decisions - on
where to locate schools, how to size them so as to make sure they
didn't overlap neighborhoods, how to draw attendance zones, what
teachers to assign - all contributed to that end. The public
involvement in creating racially imbalanced schools was such that in
1956, in an internal memo that Justice Breyer references in his dissent,
the school board said that official district policies were responsible for

' Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798-804
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., Neil Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959,
1010 (2008) (describing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion as "a statesmanlike
effort to express social values inclusively and to sustain social solidarity in the face of
irreconcilable yet reasonable value conflict," while ultimately disagreeing with his vote
to strike down Seattle and Louisville assignment plans); cf. Kevin Brown, Reflections on
Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Parents Involved: Vhy Fifty Years of Experience Shows
Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 735 (2008) ("conceding" soberly that Justice
Kennedy's simultaneous rejection of plans at issue and embrace of subtler raceconscious school assignment mechanisms accurately reflect degree of integration
"American society is willing to accept," notwithstanding dissenters' strong(er)
theoretical arguments).
' My focus is on Seattle primarily because I live there and know more about the
underlying facts. The dissenting opinions make a strong case, however, that, when
placed in its proper context, the Louisville program was equally unobjectionable.
10 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803, 807-13 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
" On the history of African-Americans in the "Central District," see Henry W.
McGee, Jr., Seattle's Central District, 1990-2006, Integration or Displacement?, 39 URB.
LAw. 167, 167-236 (2008).
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that they
much of the segregation in the city's schools. They thought
12
were going to have to adhere to Brown for that reason.
In the two decades after Brown, the school district faced multiple
legal challenges accusing it of intentionally maintaining a two-track
school system.' 3 The complaints raised strong allegations along the
lines that I've just spelled out. Those challenges were all settled by the
school district, as they were by any number of southern school
districts, and the school district took voluntary efforts to desegregate
using most of the methodologies available in the day, including pretty
significant bussing. Sometime in the 1980s, along with many other
districts across the country, the school district gradually moved to a
"school choice" plan or model out of a combination of frustration with
bussing, the desire to stem white flight to the suburbs and private
schools, and the desire to achieve and balance other educational
objectives.
The various school choice models that they used made modest use
of race in their plans, nothing more than an attempt to limit
backsliding on the integration efforts, as they're balancing these other
goals, as they're shifting the methodology. The reality of the Seattle
schools today is that, particularly at the elementary level, Seattle still
operates -

for complicated public and private reasons -

as a two-

track school system. Particularly in the central cluster where I live,
which is the most racially and ethnically diverse area of the city, there
are mostly white schools and there are mostly black schools. This is in
large part a legacy of district policies to build small elementary schools
near each other to draw attendance zones in particular ways. It's
exacerbated by a byzantine choice system that allows high social
capital parents to migrate out of a local school if it's perceived to be
undesirable, but also establishes strong entitlements to attend that
school if it is deemed desirable. In large measure, the scheme
combines two highly segregative mechanisms: it mirrors residential
segregation but allows high social capital parents to opt out of what
would otherwise be their residentially-assigned school.14
12 For Justice Breyer's reference to the memo, see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at

807-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (declaring unconstitutional state law that mandated separate public schools for
black and white students).
13 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP")
filed a federal lawsuit in 1969 and a complaint with the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights in 1977. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S.
at 808.
14 The Seattle School District recently approved a new school assignment plan that
makes some significant changes in assignment practices. Advocates for the plan claim

HeinOnline -- 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 931 2009-2010

932

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 43:927

A series of policies that the schools have today marks the schools,
lets people know immediately which of the two tracks the schools are
on, and discourages people from sending children to schools on the
other track. Uniform policies tend to be different at predominantly
white and black schools. Particularly in the central part of the city,
predominantly white elementary schools have a lot more recess than
predominantly African-American schools; some of the predominantly
African-American schools don't even have recess. The discipline
policies are different at predominantly white and predominantly
African-American schools. The expectations that are imbued in the
students are different. So, there really is this ongoing problem of
publicly facilitated segregation going on in the Seattle schools.
In this historical context, the minor efforts of the school district to
ameliorate the re-segregative effects of the school choice plan were, in
many ways, the least that they could do. The quirk of the litigation
posture of this case was that it was in no one's interest to tell this
story. The Seattle School District, who was trying to defend the
constitutionality of their own efforts, in no way wanted to drag their
own history before the Court and to trash their predecessors, as might
have been necessary to put the racial tiebreakers in proper context.
Certainly, the plaintiffs had no interest in that because they didn't
want to establish that the schools may have been historically
segregated. To their credit, all four of the dissenters in this case
figured out this history, understood the deeper context. Justice
Breyer's tour-de-force dissent was in many ways an attempt to go back
to the record in Seattle and do a similar thing in Louisville and to
explain the true context of this case.
To return to Justice Stevens after this digression into the details of
Seattle's past, the contrast between his dissent and Justice Breyer's is
interesting. 5 Though they agree on the history, and they ultimately
agree on most of the law, the case is easier for Justice Stevens. He can
do in five pages what it takes Justice Breyer seventy-seven pages to do.
Justice Stevens's methodology allows him to go right to the evidence,
that it will increase equity by, among other things, permitting students who live in
desirable residence zones to attend their neighborhood schools even if they miss early
enrollment deadlines. Critics of the plan conversely claim that it will decrease equity
by reducing the ability of parents to move their children out of undesirable schools.
While the ultimate consequences of the new plan remain conjecture, at the macrolevel, it does not disturb the troubling structure described above: school assignment in
Seattle reflects persistent patterns of racial segregation and then reinforces that
problem by allowing parents with sufficient knowledge and fortitude to opt out of
undesirable schools.
15 See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 932 2009-2010

20101

Justice Stevens and the Seattle Schools Case

933

to go right to what's at stake, whereas the other dissenters have to
struggle to figure out how all of this information fits into the
preexisting framework, into preexisting distinctions between "de jure"
and "de facto" segregation, into preexisting categories of strict scrutiny
versus lesser levels of scrutiny.
There is an elegant simplicity to Justice Stevens's dissent. What his
dissent says is: this is an easy case. An impartial sovereign is acting in
a responsible way to deal with complicated problems and ameliorate
an ongoing historical wrong in which it was complicit. We should not
only allow it, but we should applaud it. He says that the only excuse
for treating this as anything other than an easy case is the "wooden"
formalism - and here he uses the same words that I talked about in
the Fordham article - of modern equal protection analysis. 16 That
jurisprudence allows the Court to ignore the obvious, to refuse to
acknowledge important pockets of evidence, and requires them to
rigidly adhere to doctrinal categories even when those categories push
the Court to a result that is antithetical to the text and the values of
the Equal Protection Clause. I think that this dissent is a powerful
example of the wisdom, the common sense as some have said, of
Justice Stevens's methodologies.
So what do you do with that if you're Justice Stevens, or even if
you're Justice Breyer who, in this case, ultimately ends up in the same
place? What's their reaction, what's their emotion in this case, how did
they behave? I like to characterize their dissents in this case as being
different from many other cases because they express what I call a
"righteous anger." How do you define that? What are requisites of
righteous anger? Well, righteous anger is a belief that, in a crucially
important case, the Court got things really wrong for reasons that are
related to some deeper flaw in their values, their ideology, or their
jurisprudence, and that they should have known better. Those are, I
believe, the intellectual requisites, but there's something more to it
than that; those are necessary, but they're not sufficient. There's also a
subjective element - a genuine feeling of actual provocation or anger
that characterizes cases of righteous anger - and I think you can see
that in the Justices' opinions, in their dissents. But it is interesting how
it expresses itself. When Justices feel that way, when they have this
kind of righteous ahger (or other constitutional thinkers have this
kind of righteous anger), how do they proceed? How should they
proceed?

16

Id. at 800.
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Well, there's a fundamental choice that a Justice has to make at the
beginning: do you harness or suppress this indignation? You can
understand why sometimes it's important to let the world know the
stakes in a particular case, but you can also understand why it pushes
against traditional notions of the judicial role. I think in recent years
Justices on both sides of the Court's ideological divide increasingly
have tried to harness their righteous indignation or righteous anger in
constitutional cases. 17 Their goals appear to be varied: to keep the
issues alive within the Court, to draw the attention of the general
public to cases, to draw Congress's attention if it's a statutory case, to
draw the attention of later Courts, and largely, I think, to appeal to the
court of history - to say that we knew that this was wrong, we knew
that this was putting us on the wrong course.
But then that leads to the question, how do you express that
righteous anger? How is a responsible common law judge, someone
who really believes in the role - believes in the decorum of the Court
- to express that? You can, if you want, follow the path of Justice
Scalia: let sarcasm come into your opinion, let invective characterize
your writing, fill your opinions with attacks on the integrity and the
ability of your colleagues. And, if we are honest, we all slip into that to
some extent; few commentators, few judges or Justices, uniformly
escape that tone.
I want to submit that Justice Stevens represents another approach.
When the stakes are high and the Court goes sufficiently off course, he
is not one to stifle his righteous anger. But his method of expressing
that anger is different. I think he's the master of using formalized
lawyerly mechanisms for expressing righteous anger - using small
breaches of protocol and other forms of subtle signaling to indicate to
people in the know just how angry he is.
What are some of the mechanisms of formalized righteous anger?
What does a judge do to signal to people in the know how angry he or
she is?
(1)

Well, one of the things that we have seen recently is an
increasing use of oral dissents - dissents from the bench and some people have written provocatively about that. 8

17 Why this has happened is an interesting question. We might attribute it to a
changing culture on the Supreme Court, or to an increasing attention to hot-button
issues, or to something about the confirmation process. If you prefer, you can lay
blame with the Reagan Justice Department or, if you think big personalities set
institutional tones, with Justice Scalia.
18 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REV. 4
(2008) (arguing that oral dissents from Court spurs ordinary people to action);
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Justice Breyer held court for a long time, one of the longest
oral dissents in history, in this very case. 19
(2)

Justices also at times express their anger by making unusually
explicit appeals to other branches; you saw that, for example,
in the Ledbetter case from the same term. 20

(3)

You can express righteous anger by expressly marking
decisions as so deviant that you won't give them stare decisis
effects. This card can't be played too often, but, if used
sparingly, can be an effective signal of righteous anger.
Certainly, for example, the Court's more liberal members have
used this tool to indicate their continued indignity at the
Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity revolution.2 1

(4)

A Justice might mark a case as unusually important and
unusually frustrating by filing an opinion at an unusual
procedural stage or captioning an opinion in an unusual way.
The dissenting and concurring opinions that accompanied the
grant of an injunction stopping the Florida vote count in Bush
v. Gore are a classic example.22 The best illustration of the
degree to which an unusually timed opinion might signal that
something is rotten at the Court is the famed - though never
filed - dissent from the relisting of the cert petition in
Casey,23 prepared when that case was being held in conference
for allegedly political reasons. 24 Threatening to speak at times
when Justices normally don't can be a powerful tool for the
expression of passion.

Timothy R. Johnson et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to
Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560 (2009) (analyzing whether announcing
dissents from bench has effect on legal policy and Supreme Court decisionmaking).
19 See Guinier, supra note 18, at 8-9 (narrating courtroom scene during Justice
Breyer's dissent).
20 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Congress took Justice Ginsburg's advice in the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
21 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92, 97 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole
Tribe as controlling precedent.").
22 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring on issuance of
stay); id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting on issuance of stay).
23 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S
SUPREME COURTJOURNEY 202 (2005).
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(5)

One formalized expression of righteous anger that is perhaps
overblown in the popular press but certainly carries some
weight is the decision by a dissenting Justice to leave out the
word "respectfully" when expressing their dissent. For the
most part, it is an old wives tale - or whatever the lawyerly
equivalent of that is - to suggest the Justices always say "I
respectfully dissent" except when they are angry. But you
definitely see Justices writing around the locution "I
respectfully dissent" in cases where they can't muster the
stomach to say that.

(6)

A Justice might also express righteous anger by writing at
disproportionate length or marshaling evidence that goes
beyond the record, both of which Justice Breyer did in the
PICS case.

(7)

Finally, a Justice might express such anger by making
uncharacteristic references, comments, or personal asides
intended to draw attention to the uniqueness of a case. In the
end, that is what Justice Stevens's dissent in the PICS case is
going to be most famous for. His five pages will be most
remembered for three references. First is his quotation at the
beginning of the opinion of Anatole France's observation that
"the majestic equality of the la[w] forbid[s] rich and poor
alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
their bread."25 Second is his conspicuous personalized
references to opinions by leading Republican-appointed
federal appellate judges Alex Kozinski and Michael Boudin
strongly disagreeing with the majority's approach; his
reference to them as "two of our wisest federal judges" is
simultaneously accurate and snide.26 Finally, it will be famous
for its unusual concluding salvo insisting that "[iut is my firm
conviction that no members of the court that
I joined in 1975
27
would have agreed with today's decision."

I think in sum, what both Justices Breyer and Stevens did in the
PICS case is use lawyerly tools to mark this as a case where righteous
indignation, righteous anger is the appropriate response. Now, these
kinds of stylized expressions of anger are subject to criticism from
" Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 800
(2007), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (THE RED

LILY) 95 (W. Stephens trans., 6th ed. 1922)).
26 551 U.S. at 800.
27 Id. at 803.
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both sides. On one hand, there certainly is an argument that this kind
of signaling is inappropriate, it's not the way that judges speak, it goes
too far. On the other hand, you can make the argument that it is too
subtle, too inside baseball, that it doesn't go far enough. You can use
Bush v. Gore as an example here. Everyone in liberal circles loved
Justice Stevens's famous dissent in that case.2" Still, many people
whom I encountered were in shock that the dissenting Justices did not
put up more of a fuss. To paraphrase their comments, they wondered
"Wait. They just stole the Presidency and all you can do is leave out
the word 'respectfully'?"
In articles that follow I want to explore those criticisms from both
sides and interrogate my intuition that Justice Stevens hits the right
middle tone in cases like the PICS case. But for today, all I really
wanted to do is to highlight the issue. I appreciate the opportunity you
have given me to do so.

' Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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